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Available online xxxxBackground: In 2007, the Indonesian Government instigated a national program to convert domestic kerosene
users to liqueﬁed petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking. This was primarily motivated by the rising cost of kerosene
subsidies.
Objective:To review thenational conversionprogramand LPG scale upby evaluating its impacts, including assessing
sustained changes in cooking behaviour and consequent reductions in exposure to household air pollution (HAP).
Methods and data sources: Searches of peer-review and grey literature in both English and Bahasa Indonesian were
conducted and supplemented by interviews with key informants, data from the National Statistics Agency and re-
sults from household surveys. The data were extracted and analyzed using an Implementation Science approach.
Results: The main kerosene to LPG conversion phase took place in highly populated kerosene dependent areas be-
tween 2007 and 2012 reaching over 50 million households, approximately two thirds of all households in
Indonesia. Since then the drive to expand LPG use has continued at a slower pace, especially in more remote prov-
inces where solid fuel is more widely used. Over 57million LPG start up kits were distributed as of 2015. Beginning
in 2018, the open subsidy for LPG is expected to be replaced by one targeted at lower income households.While the
main conversion phase has been highlighted as an example of effective and impressively fast fuel switching at scale,
the impact on domestic biomass use remains limited.
Conclusions:Addressing HAP and the health impacts associatedwith kerosene and biomass usewas never an objec-
tive of the program. Consequently, there is limited evidence of impact in this area, and in hindsight, missed oppor-
tunities in terms of inﬂuencing cooking behaviour change among biomass users, who are more at risk.
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Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago and the fourth largest
country, with over 260 million inhabitants in 2016. It is classiﬁed as a
lower-middle income country with GDP per capita of US$3570 and an
urban population of 55% (World Bank, 2017). Household air pollution
(HAP) from daily use of solid fuels is an important contributor to mor-
tality and morbidity in Indonesia. In 2016, an estimated 60,835 deaths
(4% of all deaths) and 33.7 million lost disability-adjusted life years
(DALYs) (2.5% of all DALYs) due to ischemic heart disease, stroke,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, lung cancer, and acute lower re-
spiratory infections were attributed to HAP (IHME, 2017). Theseed by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
al., The Mega Conversion P
nergy..., Energy Sustain Dev (2numbers have dropped from 1990, when HAP accounted for 8% of all
deaths and 6% of all DALYS reported.
In 2007, the Indonesian Government embarked on the largest house-
hold fuel conversion program for cooking that had been attempted at that
time, to phase out the domestic use of kerosene completely in ﬁve years
and replace it with liqueﬁed petroleum gas (LPG). LPG is an abundant
by-product of oil reﬁning and natural gas extraction, and is a clean-
burning and portable fuel used as the primary or secondary cooking fuel
by almost 3 billion people across developing and developed countries
(Bruce, Aunan, & Rehfuess, 2017; WLPGA & Argus, 2018).
In terms of the Government's stated objectives, the program was
successful in reducing domestic kerosene use by 92% in less than
10 years.While subsidy reductionswere achieved, the cost effectiveness
of these reductions needs to be considered in light of a high initial sub-
sidy and the sustainability of the changes in termsof rising energy prices
and growing energy needs. The impact on household cooking behavior,.
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2 K. Thoday et al. / Energy for Sustainable Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxxsustained usage of LPG for daily cooking and associated health gains has
also been less clear.
The objectives of this investigation were to review the conversion
program in terms of sustained changes in cooking behaviour and conse-
quent reductions in exposure to HAP. It also sought to characterize the
factors that contributed to successful program implementation and de-
termine what lessons might be transferrable to other countries seeking
to rapidly move towards clean cooking, particularly at scale.
Sources, methods and approach
Multiple sources of quantitative secondary data, combined with pri-
mary qualitative data, have been used for this case study investigation.
Searches of peer-reviewed and grey literature concerning the conver-
sion program and current household fuel use were conducted in both
English and Bahasa Indonesian. Searches were conducted in Scopus
and Google Scholar using the keywords ‘LPG’ and ‘Indonesia’ in order
to be as inclusive as possible. Primary fuel usage data were extracted
from the National Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia)
and from household surveys published in peer-reviewed and grey liter-
ature identiﬁed through the search,which also provided information on
cooking fuel use practices and expenditure. Data were also accessed
from the Ministry of Health and the National Consumer Protection
Agency with online local newspaper searches being carried out in
Bahasa Indonesian using the terminology of LPG consumer use and
safety. It is rare that exchange rates accompany ﬁgures, so these are
not always included when presenting costs that are only given in US
dollars rather than in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR). Where calculations
have been made by the authors, unless otherwise speciﬁed, the ex-
change rate used is the exchange rate as of January 1st in the quoted
year; consequently some costs given in US dollars might be different
than those published in previous literature.
We contacted all stakeholders involved in program implementation
in order to review data that existed. Six semi-structured face-to-face in-
terviews plus a telephonic interview were conducted with the main
program implementers and other key stakeholders with continued
follow-up. Those interviewed included representatives of the Ministry
of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) (Analyst, Price and Subsidy
Directorate), the Industry and Energy Agency of Jakarta Provincial Gov-
ernment (Head of Energy and Electricity, and colleagues), the National
Oil Company Pertamina (Assistant Manager - Planning and Evaluation,
Senior ofﬁcer and colleagues), as well as the World Bank in relation to
the Indonesia Clean Stove Initiative (Senior Energy Specialist) and the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Indonesia
ofﬁce (Indonesian Program Co-ordinator, Global Subsidies Initiative,
(GSI)1). Due to the length of time that had passed since the program's
initial implementation in 2007 we were unable to follow-up with
some stakeholders, primarily the Ministry of Women's Empowerment
and Ministry of Social Affairs where no program records appeared to
have been retained. Informal enquiries were also made with the
World Health Organization Regional Ofﬁce for South East Asia, interna-
tional and local NGOs focusing on clean cookstoves such as GERES and
Kopernik, the Air Pollution Division of the Ministry of Environment
and Forestry, and the Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia
in Jakarta.
Two of the six interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesian and
the rest in English. Interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed ver-
batim and translated into English when necessary. The interview data
were extracted and analyzed in Microsoft Word using an implementa-
tion science approach (Glasgow, Vogt, & Boles, 1999). Data were syn-
thesised according to the following categories: (i) program goals and
geographical reach, (ii) program roll-out and sustained use of1 The IISD Global Subsidy Initiative supports international processes, national govern-
ments and civil society organizations to align subsidies with sustainable development.
See http://www.iisd.org/gsi/.
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and (iv) where the program stands now.
Kerosene to LPG conversion program
Background
Indonesia was, until the 1990s, a net exporter of oil and gas. The
country has traditionally provided energy subsidies to its citizens,
which peaked at 18% of total state expenditure in 2005 (Pertamina &
WLPGA, 2012). These subsidies, including diesel, gasoline and kerosene,
were justiﬁed as a form of social assistance. In 2007, kerosene was the
primary cooking fuel for 37% of households (MEMR, 2016a) – 20.9 mil-
lion households out of a total of 56.4 million (BPS, 2017) (see Fig. 1).
However, a decline in domestic supply and increase in oil prices
meant the amount of subsidy the Governmentwas providing for house-
hold kerosene was becoming onerous, climbing from USD $1.96 billion
in 2005 to USD $5.24 billion in 2008 (Budya & Arofat, 2011). Reducing
the subsidy by increasing the price of kerosene had resulted in serious
rioting (Beaton& Lontoh, 2010). The over-ridingmotivation for the con-
version program was therefore to reduce the total subsidy while
protecting households from economic shocks. Kerosene subsidies had
already been phased out in the industrial sector in 2005 and fuel leakage
from the subsidized domestic sector to the industrial sector (and even
abroad where kerosene was more expensive) was further increasing
the strain on the state budget (Pertamina & WLPGA, 2012).
Trends in primary cooking fuel usage from 2007 to 2015 are illus-
trated in Fig. 1.
LPGwas chosen as the conversion fuel for various reasons. Although
the economic price per kilogram of LPG was 24% more expensive than
kerosene at the time of the program launch in 2007 (IDR 7966/US$
0.89/kg for LPG compared to IDR 5570/US$ 0.61/l for kerosene) it was
calculated that LPG's higher caloriﬁc value would make it cheaper to
subsidize, allowing the Government to maintain low and constant en-
ergy costs to the consumer at lower budgetary cost (MEMR, 2007).
The University of Trisakti in Jakarta estimated that 1 l of kerosene was
equivalent in end use to 0.39 kg of LPG and this was used as the basis
for calculating subsidy savings (Budya & Arofat, 2011). Secondly, LPG
was chosen as elements of the supply chain were already in place (e.g.
storage tanks and ﬁlling plants) and it was the easiest fuel to distribute
to rural and remote populations across a vast territory. Indonesia is
made up of many islands with seismically active volcanoes impeding
grid infrastructure. It is not clear if cost beneﬁt analyses were done on
alternative fuels for cooking, but these were not seen as commercially
developed enough to consider at the time (Budya & Arofat, 2011).
In 2008, Pertamina commissioned a private company, GreenWorks
Asia, to calculate projected greenhouse gas emission reductions as a re-
sult of the program but health indicators were not considered (Budya &
Arofat, 2011). Table 1 indicates that in comparison to LPG, kerosene
contributes three times as much carbon monoxide (CO) emissions and2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Fig. 1. Percentage of households and their primary cooking fuel in Indonesia, 2007–2015.
(Source: BPS, 2017)
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Table 1
Relative health-damaging pollutant emissions of various fuels relative to LPG (g/MJd).
(Source: Smith et al. (2000), Smith, Rogers, and Cowlin (2005))
Emissions Biogas LPG Kerosene Wood residues Crop
CO 0.1 1 3 19 60
Particulate matter (PM) 2.5 1 1.3 26 124
Note: The values are shown as grams per megajoule of energy delivered to the cooking
pot.
3K. Thoday et al. / Energy for Sustainable Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxx30% more particulate matter (PM) per unit of energy delivered to the
cooking pot. Kerosene is now also categorized as a polluting fuel based
on assessments of the relative risks and exposures associated with its
use. The World Health Organization (WHO) Indoor Air Quality Guide-
lines recommend against the use of kerosene as household fuel for
both cooking and lighting (WHO, 2014). Overall, LPG is a clean fuel in
comparison to other major fuels for cooking, meeting guidelines for
the highest tier level (Tier 4) under the International Organization for
Standardization, International Workshop Agreement 11 (ISO/IWA-11)
(Shen, Hays, Smith, Williams, Faircloth, and Jetter, 2018).Program goals and implementation process
The kerosene to LPG conversion program, also known as the Zero
Kero Program, was initiated in 2007 based on the Presidential Decree
No. 104/2007. The initial program goal was to convert 6 million house-
holds in 2007 and approximately 42 million households and micro-
businesses nationally by 2012 (MEMR, 2007). This was approximately
two-thirds of the number of households estimated to be in the country
in 2012 and included households that used kerosene not as their pri-
mary fuel (MEMR, 2016a).
A taskforce chaired byMEMRwas set up for the implementation of the
scheme, comprised of the Ministries reported in Table 2 (MEMR, 2007).
Pertamina, as the only wholesale LPG marketer in the country, was
given the sole license to supply domestic LPG under the program.
Pertamina was initially concerned that lower subsidies would result in
lower revenues to invest in infrastructure and wanted a longer time-
frame for implementation in order to expand the LPG supply and ensure
adequate storage facilities and ﬁlling stations to meet the ambitious
program target.
The leadership of the Vice President Jusuf Kalla in driving the pro-
gram throughwasmentioned by interviewed stakeholders as a key fac-
tor inﬂuencing the success of the program. Parliamentary approval was
key to create the legal and regulatory framework, as well as the enforce-
ment capacity needed for widespread LPG dissemination (Budya &
Arofat, 2011; MEMR, 2007; Pertamina & WLPGA, 2012).
Provincial Governments also had a key role in implementation with
responsibility for: (i) licensing LPG distributors to ensure regular supply;Table 2
Governmental steering team for the LPG conversion program.
(Source: MEMR (2007))
Ministries Role
National team for Poverty Alleviation
(TNP2K) under the Vice President's ofﬁce
Political instigator
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
(MEMR)
Co-ordinator
Ministry of Finance Budget
Ministry of Industry Procurement of cylinders
Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprise Procurement of stoves
Oil and Gas Regulatory Agency Withdrawal of kerosene
Ministry of Social Affairs Transfer of professions in kerosene
trading business
Ministry of Women Empowerment Socialisation/communication
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transportation; and (iii) targeting households for conversion. The provin-
cial Government of Jakarta, for example, speciﬁcally targeted households
with expenditure of less than IDR1,500,000 (about US$ 167) amonth and
without an LPG stove (Jakarta Provincial Government, 2011).
Phases of conversion
Implementation focused on areas with LPG infrastructure readiness,
ease of distribution and high consumption of kerosene. Consequently,
the initial focus was on the capital region in Western Indonesia, which
is highly populated. About half of the country's population live on the is-
land of Java.
In total, there are 34 Provinces in Indonesia (see Fig. 2). The program
was divided into several stages. Eight provinces a year were targeted in
the ﬁrst three years of the program (yellow, green and orange in Fig. 2)
with a primary focus on bigger cities and urban areas; a further 5 be-
tween 2012 and 2015 (blue), and since 2016 targeted areas have been
those previously considered out of scope in the Eastern part of the
country - Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua, plus further consolidation
on islands off Sumatra (red circles). This involves the construction of 5
new LPG primary storage facilities for a total storage capacity of 6000
tons at a cumulative cost of IDR 871.45 billion (US$ 62 million)
(MEMR, 2016b).
As part of the conversion program, free LPG starter packages were
distributed to households andmicro-businesses consisting of a 3 kgﬁlled
cylinder (chosen for easy handling), a one-burner stove, a rubber hose
and a regulator. The cost to Pertamina of one conversion package is esti-
mated at around IDR 300,000 (US$ 33 in 2007 or US$ 21 in 2017, due to
the drop in value of the Indonesian Rupiah) (interviewwith Pertamina).
By 2010 the original target of distributing 42 million starter packages by
2012 was reached (see Fig. 3) and the target was increased to 54–58
million units (Pertamina & WLPGA, 2012). By 2015, over 57 million
starter packages were distributed (MEMR, 2016b). While the number
of micro-businesses (e.g. food street vendors) converted to LPG has not
been clearly tracked, the Industry and Energy Department of the Jakarta
Province indicated that 6% of their support was targeted to micro-
businesses in Jakarta (interview with Industry and Energy Agency of Ja-
karta Provincial Government).
TheMinistry of Industry supported the early phase of the conversion
in terms of ensuring the LPG starter packages were ready for distribu-
tion and developing an IndonesianNational Standard for the LPG stoves,
hoses and regulators (Pertamina &WLPGA, 2012). The number of cylin-
ders initially injected in the early phase of the conversion programwas
insufﬁcient tomeet demand, so localmanufacturing of cylinders quickly
became a job growth area. The number of cylinder manufacturing cen-
tres grew from 13 to 67 by 2012. However, manufacturing capacity
quickly overshot actual cylinder demand, reaching a national produc-
tion surplus of 7 million cylinders per month in 2012 (Pertamina &
WLPGA, 2012). This created opportunities for illegal cylinder ﬁlling, as
further explained in the ‘cost and subsidy savings’ section later in the
document.
Consumption of LPG and kerosene
Provincial authorities were responsible for withdrawing kerosene
sale licenses and distributing LPG sale licenses, and needed to pass reg-
ulations to do this. They faced challenges in streamlining supply and
segmenting distribution channels (interview with Industry and Energy
Agency of Jakarta Provincial Government).
Overall, domestic kerosene consumption in Indonesia shrank dra-
matically, from 10 million kiloliters (kl) in 2006 to 0.8 million kl in
2015 – a 92% reduction in use. In the same period, LPG household con-
sumption rose from 1.1 million tons (Mt) to 6.3 Mt in 2015 (Pertamina,
2017b) contributing to 8% of Indonesia's total energy mix (MEMR,
2016a). As shown in Fig. 4, this corresponds to an increase in LPGrogram from kerosene to LPG in Indonesia: Lessons learned and
018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2018.05.011
Fig. 2. Phases of kerosene to LPG conversion by Province (2007–2016). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to theweb version of this article.)
Source: Adapted fromWiratmaja (2016)
4 K. Thoday et al. / Energy for Sustainable Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxxconsumption from 4.7 kg/capita in 2007 to 24.4 kg/capita in 2015 and a
concomitant decrease of kerosene from 57.3 kg/capita to 3.1 kg/capita
in the same period. Compared to the global LPG market, Indonesia
started with a low LPG penetration (less than 5 kg/capita per year),
which is comparable to current LPG penetration levels in many Sub-
Saharan African countries (Argus & WLPGA, 2016). It then doubled its
penetration in just a few years and by 2015 it reached penetration
rates similar to those of mature LPG markets such as Brazil (25.5 kg/
capita in 2014). The data presented in Fig. 4 take into account popula-
tion growth, which has increased from 214 million in 2001 to 258 mil-
lion in 2015.
Pertamina secured LPG supply (increasingly imported over time)
based on ﬁve and ten-year contracts, and between 2007 and 2015
added new LPG storage facilities in Java and other parts of the coun-
try to match demand. Oil and gas are split into upstream and down-
stream businesses and it is unclear to what extent Pertamina was
able to invest in LPG production plants as domestic supply was
shrinking. In terms of LPG reﬁlling stations (also called bottling
plants), 395 new stations were created during the main conversionFig. 3. Number of free LPG starter kits distributed from
(Source: Adapted from MEMR (2016b))
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(Pertamina, 2016). As of 2017, there were 600 reﬁlling stations
across Indonesia with an estimated 3 kg cylinder capacity of
6.5 million cylinders/day (Pertamina, 2016). In Jakarta itself, there
were 15 reﬁlling stations, 2071 LPG wholesalers and 2753 LPG re-
tailers in 2017 to service a population of at least 10million. However,
it is not clear how this compares with those previously working in
the kerosene supply chain (interview with Industry and Energy
Agency of Jakarta Provincial Government).
In 2007, only 11% of LPG was imported; by 2015, imports reached
64% to meet the increasing demand (MEMR, 2016a). The Government
is now seeking to produce dimethyl ether (DME) from coal to reduce
exclusive reliance on LPG (as dimethyl ether can be blended with LPG
and be used as a domestic cooking fuel without modiﬁcations to equip-
ment or distribution networks) (Sundaryani, 2017). China, for example,
has beenusing LPG-DMEblends (20%DME in LPG) for domestic cooking
applications, but DME is more corrosive and there is some concern in
the industry about the long term effects of DME-LPG blending on LPG
equipment and components (leading to more leaks and thus more2007 to 2015 as part of the Zero Kero program.
rogram from kerosene to LPG in Indonesia: Lessons learned and
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stoves is also reduced the more DME is in the blend (Arya, Tupkari,
Satish, Thakre, & Shukla, 2016).Cost and subsidy savings
According to MEMR ﬁgures, the conversion cost of the 57.2 million
starter packages and their distribution between 2007 and 2016 is esti-
mated at IDR 13.63 trillion or US$ 1.02 billion2 (MEMR, 2016c).
The Government set the retail price in 2007 at the subsidized price of
4250 IDR/kg (0.47 US$/kg) so a 3 kg cylinder would cost IDR 12,750 (US
$ 1.42) (Budya & Arofat, 2011). In comparison, the average cost of sub-
sidized LPG in India for below poverty line households in 2017 was
around 0.53 US$/kg (Indane, 2017) and around 0.97 US$/kg in
Cameroon, where the LPG is universally subsidized (AllAfrica, 2016).
Regional governments were also authorised to regulate the retail price
to accommodate additional costs for transportation. In Jakarta, the
highest retail price for a 3 kg cylinder reported in 2016 was IDR 16000
(US$ 1.20) (Pertamina, 2017a).
The total subsidy saving for the government between 2006 and
2016, compared to subsidizing kerosene at the historical rate and taking
into account the starter package cost, is reported at IDR 216.4 trillion
(US$ 15.6 billion) (MEMR, 2016c). However, while there have been sav-
ings in terms of subsidizing LPG instead of kerosene, with declining oil
production and growing energy demands the cost of Government en-
ergy subsidies has continued to rise relative to actual fuel cost
(Asmarini, 2017). These are the very same factors that informed the de-
cision to shift from kerosene. The cost of the LPG subsidy also remains
highly unpredictable, ﬂuctuating with the crude oil price. For example,
the LPG subsidy cost to the government was almost twice as much in
2014 as in 2015, costing IDR 48.9 trillion (US$ 4 billion) in 2014 com-
pared to IDR 25.8 trillion (US$ 2.1 billion) a year later (GSI, 2017). In
2016, Parliament agreed that further reformwas neededwith subsidies
retained for LPG but only if targeted at poorer users (GSI, 2017).
Pertamina reported US$1.7 billion of direct investment as of 2009 to
expand infrastructure (Budya & Arofat, 2011) and US$1.9 billion of in-
vestment was reported in a presentation given in 2016 (Pertamina,
2016). However, between 2008 and 2013 they also reported losses to-
taling IDR 22 trillion (quoted in source as US$1.5 billion) because of
12 kg LPG reﬁlls being sold below market price (Toft, Beaton, &
Lontoh, 2016). To address this, Pertamina tried to increase the price of
12 kg cylinder reﬁlls in September 2014 (GSI, 2015). However, the dif-
ference between the subsidized price of LPG in 3 kg cylinders and the
unsubsidized price of LPG in 12 kg cylinders created an arbitrage oppor-
tunity exploited by grey-market reﬁllers and consumers willing to buy2 Exchange rate IDR 13,350 = US$ 1 used in MEMR conversions.
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prior to the conversion program migrated to the cheaper 3 kg reﬁlls,
some bought 12 kg reﬁlls from grey market reﬁllers at the subsidized
price, with concomitant safety issues.
Another attempt to increase revenue for unsubsidized fuel was the
introduction in 2015 of a new 5.5 kg cylinder. This was also to prepare
for an anticipated end to uniform subsidies for 3 kg cylinders (see
Where Indonesia stands now: announced subsidy reform section). The
new 5.5 kg cylinders are branded in pink, lighter in weight and pro-
moted as safer than 3 kg cylinders to encourage transition for so-
called ‘capable communities’ who can afford the unsubsidized price.
The 5.5 kg LPG reﬁll costs around IDR 64,000 (US$ 4.70), corresponding
to 11,600 IDR/kg (0.90US$/kg) - almost three times the price of 3 kg cyl-
inder reﬁlls. To date marketing has been targeted in East Java, Bali and
Nusa Tenggara with uptake reported at a monthly average of 107 t as
of September 2017 (Hariyanto & Putra, 2017).
Initial program roll-out, adoption and usage of LPG
Before the launch of the program, Pertamina conducted twomarket
tests (with 500 and 25,000 households, respectively) to check accep-
tance and test the distributionmodel, which offered encouraging results
(Budya & Arofat, 2011). The Ministry of Woman's Empowerment was
initially tasked with building the consumer education component for
the program, but Pertamina, as the direct implementer took on a key
role in terms of addressing consumer concerns relating to supply, cost
and safety.
Pertamina reported signiﬁcant opposition from kerosene retailers
worried about the lower margin and initial investment costs in
switching to selling LPG in the ﬁrst six months of implementation in Ja-
karta. Attempts to address this included establishing incentives and
loans, and offsetting the cylinder warranty by the margin (Pertamina,
2008). Some protests arose also from the population as a result of inﬂa-
tion in both kerosene and LPG prices during the initial kerosene with-
drawal period, and reports of kerosene scarcity outside conversion
areas (whichmayhave been a result of kerosenebeing sold fromuncon-
verted areas to converted areas). Pertamina addressed this concern by
ensuring additional LPG buffer stock in areas undergoing conversion
(Budya & Arofat, 2011) and general opposition diminished over time
as the beneﬁts of the program were demonstrated (Pertamina &
WLPGA, 2012).
LPG affordability, access and safety
The distribution of the free starter packages and the fact that subsi-
dized LPG was going to be cheaper than kerosene meant that the pro-
gram taskforce expected little opposition to switching by kerosene
consumers (while biomass users were never a target of the program).rogram from kerosene to LPG in Indonesia: Lessons learned and
018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2018.05.011
Table 3
Number of recorded LPG accidents from 2007 to 2012, based on numerous sources.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Reported accidents 9a 64a 90a 352b 59b 8c
Deaths among reported
accidents
0 2 12 Not speciﬁed Not speciﬁed 2
Distributed packages
(millions)
3.7 15.8 24.2 4.6 5.6 0.2
Sources:
a BPKN (National Consumer Protection Agency) (2011).
b Pertamina and WLPGA (2012).
c Budhiana (2012), Jaya (2012), Kompas (2017b), Liputan6.com (2012), Munawar
(2012), Rahardjo (2012), Trafﬁc (2012).
6 K. Thoday et al. / Energy for Sustainable Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxxReliability of supplywas anticipated to be a greater issue, especially dur-
ing the early stages of the conversion. In 2009, a household study in
Central Java and Yogyakarta carried out by GERES found that unsurpris-
ingly, affordability and accessibility were the key determinants in fuel
choice (World Bank, 2013). Based on a 2007market surveywith 550 re-
spondents in Central Java, the weekly usage of cooking with subsidized
kerosenewas estimated at 4.4 l compared to approximately 2 kg of sub-
sidized LPG, costing US$1.10 and US$0.85 respectively (Budya & Arofat,
2011).
In the initial program roll-out, Provincial Governments collected in-
formation on accidents which were then investigated to ensure they
were not a result of faulty products. However, no consolidated record
of accidents seems to have been kept and identiﬁed records are sparse.
The data available is summarized in Table 3. According to the Industrial
and Energy Agency of Jakarta, the number of accidents was so small as
to not impact consumer uptake (interview with Industry and Energy
Agency of Jakarta Provincial Government).0.00
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According to the Indonesian National Statistics Agency, the number of
households indicating that LPG was their main cooking fuel in 2015 was
68.8% (BPS, 2017) (see Fig. 1). Of the remaining households, 4.4% reported
kerosene as their main cooking fuel, 24.4% ﬁrewood (with 14.1% in rural
areas and 10.3% in urban areas), 0.6% electricity, and less than 0.2% char-
coal (BPS, 2017). Fig. 5 shows the information for LPG, ﬁrewood and ker-
osene primary usage per province, in the order in which provinces were
converted. With the exception of the Bangka Belitung Islands, the eight
provinces targeted since 2012 show little or no change in LPG primary
usage to date. Kerosene still accounts for between 16%–52% of household
primary fuel use in these eight provinces, which are those withmore dis-
persedpopulations andwhere LPGdistribution channels remainundevel-
oped. Of the provinces converted between 2007 and 2012, there is quite a
varied picture. Jakarta shows both the smallest percentage increase in LPG
primary users at 61% (having 34% primary users already in 2007) and the
greatest percentage decrease inﬁrewood primary users at 81% (although,
in actual terms, it has the smallest number of ﬁrewood users). Two prov-
inces in North Sulawesi show the greatest percentage increase in LPG pri-
mary use at 98%, while West Sumatra shows the smallest decrease in
ﬁrewood primary users at 28% (BPS, 2017) (Fig. 5).
However, while primary fuel usage statistics are encouraging and
show a signiﬁcant switch to LPG, ﬁeld studieswith questions on second-
ary fuel usage show a high degree of fuel stacking (i.e. the side by side
use of different stoves and cooking fuels). Total energy consumptionﬁg-
ures provided by MEMR also indicate a continued high use of biomass
that if correct, challenge the primary fuel usage ﬁgures (MEMR, 2016a).
A 2010 survey of 550 households across urban, peri-urban and rural
sub-districts in Central Java found that while the conversion program
had been successful in shifting use from kerosene to LPG, LPG was
being used alongside traditional solid fuels rather than as a substituteEa
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3 GHGs (CO2, CH4 and N2O) and SLCPs e.g. BC particles and ozone precursor gases (NOx,
NMVOC andCO), and cooling agents, e.g. OCparticles and SO2weighted against CO2 over a
20 year horizon.
Table 4
Percentage of fuel stacking in selected districts in Central Java and Yogyakarta City before and after the conversion program.
Central Java sub-districts (Andadari et al., 2014)
2010 survey with n = 550 rural/peri-urban/urban HHs
Yogyakarta City, Central Java (ASTAE, 2015)
2013 survey with n = 1434 peri-urban HHs
Before (%) After (%) Change (%) After (%)
LPG only 2.2 19.5 17 9
LPG + othera 4.2 71.6 67 66 (28 LPG + wood + electricity, 18 LPG + electricity, 20 LPG + wood)
Kerosene only 32.0 0.4 −32 0
Kerosene + othera 55.5 7.8 −48 0
Wood only 6.5 6.5 0 18
Wood + othera 37.1 35.6 −1 7 (wood + electricity)
a No disaggregated fuel data available for Central Java.
7K. Thoday et al. / Energy for Sustainable Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxx(see Table 4). The survey showed that fuel stacking increased in 17% of
the surveyed households after the conversion program (Andadari,
Mulder, & Rietveld, 2014). One change documented was an increase in
electricity use for cooking, which was attributed to households having
increased income after switching to LPG from kerosene, as well as to
the higher cost of unsubsidized kerosene for lighting compared to
electricity.
A similar study conducted in 2013 under theWorld Bank Clean Stove
Initiative (CSI) involving a survey of 1434 households in peri-urban Yog-
yakarta, Central Java, showed that only 27% of the surveyed households
used a single fuel (ASTAE, 2015; Durix, Rex, & Mendizabal, 2016. The
rest used a mix of LPG, ﬁrewood and/or electricity (e.g. use of rice cooker
or rice warmer) for cooking, warming food and boiling water (see Fig. 6).
Biomass tended to be preferred for boiling water.
The degree of LPG adoption and usagewas also shown to be strongly
correlated with household income and age of the main cook. Findings
from the CSI study showed that the average monthly income of those
that used LPG was signiﬁcantly higher than that of households that
did not use LPG (see Fig. 7), while main cooks under age 35 were
more likely to use LPG than those over 55 (ASTAE, 2015). Andadari
and colleagues also reported that LPG adoption was positively corre-
lated with the respondent's level of education (Andadari et al., 2014).
Between 2007 and 2015, LPG conversion packages were distributed
to two-thirds of Indonesian households. One third of these households
were not previously using kerosene; yet it is not clear how much solid
fuel users have reduced their reliance on solid fuel. While the
Indonesian National Statistics Agency report a decrease in primary fuel-
wood usage from 50% to 24.4% between 2007 and 2015 (BPS, 2017),
ﬁeld studies discussed above show that most households continue to
use it in combination with LPG. There is no evidence that the program
implementers considered that for most biomass fuel users, LPG did
not compare favorably in terms of affordability.
The continued use of solid fuel outside urban centres is primarily be-
cause LPG cannot compete with ﬁrewood and crop residues on afford-
ability, as the latter can be collected for free. In the CSI pilot study, 77%
of solid fuel users surveyed collected free biomass, about 13% partially
collected and purchased it, and the remaining 10% paid for it.
Biomass-only households were estimated to use approximately 153 kg
of biomass per month, with households that used both biomass and
LPG using only 9 kg less biomass (ASTAE, 2015). Although users re-
ported about 2 h a week spent to collect biomass and an increased
cooking time of 13 to 14 min per day plus the time to light the ﬁre
and prepare the fuel, they did not see this as an issue that would inﬂu-
ence fuel-switching. Those using biomass also tended to have larger
families and were cooking larger volumes. In addition, the reduced
cooking times of LPG users were affected by a higher proportion using
electric rice cookers (ASTAE, 2015).
In terms of fuel expenditure, the 2010 Central Java survey reported
an average expenditure of IDR 40,000 (US$ 4.20) on LPG per month
(i.e. about 9 kg/per household or 3 small cylinders per month), which
on average was equivalent to 3% of total household monthly expendi-
ture (Andadari et al., 2014). Data on average monthly fuel costs from
the 2013 CSI survey show an increase in spending on fuel in relationPlease cite this article as: Thoday, K., et al., The Mega Conversion P
recommendations for future clean cooking energy..., Energy Sustain Dev (2to income (see Fig. 8), with users from the highest quintile spending
around IDR 55,600 (US$ 5.75) on LPG per month (i.e. about 11 kg/per
household or almost 4 small cylinders per month) (ASTAE, 2015).
Promotion of improved biomass cookstoves and biogas digesters
Recognizing that lower income and biomass using households were
challenged to adopt and convert to LPG, especially in rural and remote
areas, theMEMR Directorate of Bioenergy and theWorld Bank launched
the Indonesia Clean Stove Initiative (CSI) in 2012. The initiative, which
was part of a number of other similar World Bank/AusAID initiatives in
East Asia and the Paciﬁc, had the objective of focusing on the 25 million
households that had not converted to LPG as their primary/secondary
cooking fuel. The announced goal was to deliver 10 million improved
biomass cookstoves by 2020 with the goal of reducing exposure to HAP
(Zhang, Tuntivate, Aristanti, & Wu, 2013).
The initiative took a phased approach. Based on the initial ﬁndings
from Phase I (2012−2013) the second Phase (2014–2016) focused on
four areas: (i) establishing stove standards and testing facilities
(ii) strengthening institutions and building stakeholder capacity
(iii) designing and implementing a results-based ﬁnancing pilot; and
(iv) designing and preparing the master plan for a national program
(World Bank, 2014). As of 2016, the results-based ﬁnancing pilot incen-
tivized ten private companies to sell about 10,000 improved biomass
stoves in two pilot areas, Yogyakarta and Central Java. The draft master
plan is currently under consideration by the government and informa-
tion on stove types being promoted and tier levels is not yet in the pub-
lic domain (interview with World Bank).
Kopernik, an Indonesian NGO promoting biomass stoves, claimed
that the distribution of free LPG packages as part of the conversion pro-
gram created challenges in getting solid fuel users to purchase im-
proved biomass stoves. They resorted to loaning the improved
biomass stoves so that users were able to experience the beneﬁts before
purchasing (Kopernik, 2014).
Another smaller program targeted at rural farmers and supported by
the Dutch Government – the household Biogas Program or BIRU pro-
gram – started in 2009. As of 2017, 21,316 biogas systems have been
installed in ten provinces of Indonesia (an average of nearly 2700 di-
gesters a year) (BIRU, 2017).
Emission and health impacts of the Zero Kero conversion program
CO2 and black-carbon emissions
Based on the reductions in kerosene and increase in LPG use,
Permadi et al. estimated that the net reduction of combined Global
Warming Potential (GWP) weighted emissions3 in the ﬁrst three years
of the conversion program (2007–2010) was 8.1 Mt of CO2 equivalent,
or an approximately 31% reduction from the 2007 level. With completerogram from kerosene to LPG in Indonesia: Lessons learned and
018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2018.05.011
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to 1.1 Mt of CO2 equivalent from the 2007 level or a 42% reduction
(Permadi, Sofyan, & KimOanh, 2017). However, while successful in pro-
grammatic terms, this is only a 5% reduction of emissions from residen-
tial cooking overall due to the signiﬁcant continued use of solid fuel.
In terms of short-lived climate pollutants (PM2.5, sulphur dioxide,
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, black carbon, organic carbon and
non-methane volatile organic compound) the same study estimated
total polluting emissions would have decreased by 40% in 2010 and by
55% at program completion in 2012. Sulphur dioxide was estimated to
have decreased the most at 90% and nitrogen oxide the least at 13%
(Permadi et al., 2017). However, a reported signiﬁcant increase in bio-
mass open burning, as described in the same study, may mean that ex-
posure is not reduced overall.
Exposure and health
The 2016 Global Burden of Disease estimates indicate reductions in
mortality and morbidity rates associated with exposure to HAP from
solid fuel use in Indonesia since the programwas implemented.Mortality
is estimated to have halved from 109,846 in 1990 to 60,835 in 2016,
representing 8% and 4% of total deaths respectively, whilemorbidity is es-
timated to have decreased from over 39.6 million to 33.7 million DALYs,
corresponding to 6% and 2.5% of total DALYS in the same years (IHME,
2017). The Indonesian population has notably increased from 181million
to 258 million over the same time period (World Bank, 2017).
However, thesemortality andmorbidity ﬁgures are only based on pri-
mary fuel use estimates collected at the national level. Actual fuel con-
sumption ﬁgures, fuel-stacking and continued use of kerosene for
lighting are likely to mean that the real levels of HAP and exposure to12%
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Please cite this article as: Thoday, K., et al., The Mega Conversion P
recommendations for future clean cooking energy..., Energy Sustain Dev (2toxic pollutants have not decreased as much as these estimates suggest.
To the best of our knowledge, no longitudinal studies have been con-
ducted to compare exposure to HAP before and after the conversion pro-
gram. A cross-sectional study carried out in 2011 by Huboyo et al.
reviewed 24-hour exposure at the cooking site of 40 dual LPG and ﬁre-
wood users in two locations in West and Central Java (high-altitude and
low-altitude rural areas). This showed that the average PM2.5 emission
rate at the cooking site was approximately 0.57 mg/min (Huboyo,
Tohno, Lestari, Misohata, & Okumura, 2014), twice the level recom-
mended by WHO IAQG (i.e. 0.23 mg/min for unvented stoves) (WHO,
2014). The study also reported that PM2.5 concentrations in the living
area were almost twice as high in high-altitudes areas due to longer
cooking times with ﬁrewood and smaller kitchens and ventilation areas.
At the national level, although no evidence is available to directly attri-
bute national health improvements to the Zero Kero Conversion Program,
health statistics data indicate a decline in the prevalence rate per 1000 in-
dividuals of four diseases that can be linked to HAP, based on available
data for 2007 and 2013. Prevalence rates for pneumonia decreased from
2.1% to 1.8% between 2007 and 2013; chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease (COPD) from 11.2% to 5.1%; Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI) for
children below 5 years from 11.2% to 5.1%; and tuberculosis from 0.99%
to 0.4% (Riset Kesehatan Dasar, 2017).
Health statistics data for the same diseases were also available at the
provincial level. For provinces completely converted in 2013, it was ob-
served that a majority exhibited a decrease in the prevalence rate of the
four diseases above between 2007 and 2013 (Riset Kesehatan Dasar,
2017). However, it should be noted that this reduction, most evident
for ARI and tuberculosis, was also observed in provinces which were
not converted in 2013. Both national and provincial-level health data
for stroke and hypertension, however, generally showed an increase
in rates from 2007 to 2013.
It is important to frame the above statistics in the context of national
and international trends of increased wealth, increased access to medi-
cal care, and complex changes in nutrition, making the impact of fuel
conversion on health outcomes difﬁcult to assess. The Indonesian public
health agenda has been focusing on addressing the health impacts of
smoking and changes in smoking will also impact results.Where Indonesia stands now: announced subsidy reform
While universal energy subsidies (that is, subsidies to the price of
energy itself) are easier to administer than targeted subsidies, they are
often not very efﬁcient and disproportionately beneﬁt wealthier house-
holds (Pandey & Morris, 2006). International experience shows that
only about 8% of all energy subsidies reach the lowest income quintile
and that LPG subsidies can be even more regressive than average,
with only 4% reaching the lowest incomequintile and over 50% reaching
the highest income quintile (Granado, Coady, & Gillingham, 2012). The
2016 Government proposals for subsidy reform are primarily being34%
45%
51% 47% 50%
24%
19%
5%
 3 ($136-182)Quintile 4 ($183-289) Quintile 5 (>$290)
hly income quintile 
 & LPG Firewood
). Source: Adapted from ASTAE (2015). Note: Exchange rate to US$ are as of October 2013,
rogram from kerosene to LPG in Indonesia: Lessons learned and
018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2018.05.011
$3.0 
$3.5 $3.7 
$4.1 
$5.0 $5.3 $5.2 
$6.8 
$7.6 
$11.3 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Quintile 1
(<$94)
Quintile 2 ($95-
135)
Quintile 3
($136-182)
Quintile 4
($183-289)
Quintile 5
(>$290)
Av
er
ag
e 
m
on
th
ly
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
fu
el
 
(U
S$
)
Household monthly income quintile  
LPG
Biomass
Fig. 8.Householdmonthly spending on purchased fuel (US$) by income inperi-urban Yogyakarta City, Central Java (2013). Source: Adapted fromASTAE (2015). Note: Only approximately
10% of surveyed households purchased biomass. Exchange rate to US$ are as of October 2013, the time when the survey was completed.
9K. Thoday et al. / Energy for Sustainable Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxxdriven by relieving budgetary pressure with the added objective of im-
proving social welfare.
Overall, Indonesia's energy subsidies have continued to rise and
there has been strong pressure, particularly from the international com-
munity, to reduce them and direct funds to infrastructure and social se-
curity instead. An LPG subsidy of IDR 46.87 trillion (US$ 3.5 billion) has
been reportedly allocated in 2018 (Rambu Energy, 2017), but the Gov-
ernment has agreed to target it to 26 million households considered
the poorest 40%, and address distribution in harder to reach areas
(GSI, 2017). 2.3 million micro-businesses and an undisclosed number
of farmers and ﬁshermen are also expected to be targeted (GSI, 2017).
Proposals suggest that households will be targeted through registra-
tion in the Uniﬁed Database (UDB) for social protection programs and
the subsidy for 3 kg cylinders transferred using e-cash through smart-
card technology, integrated with Indonesia's banking system, the
Sejahtera Family Card (Kompas, 2017a). The subsidy budget is based
on each household using three 3 kg LPG cylinders per month. This is
in line with LPG actual use of 8–11 kg/per household per month as de-
scribed by survey data reported in earlier sections. However, challenges
to this plan remain. Up to 2017, only 800,000 households have Sejahtera
Family Cards, few anticipated end-users are registered and the number
and locations of LPG distribution points do not yet match location of
targeted populations (GSI, 2017; Kompas, 2017a). Furthermore, at
least some Provincial Governments have expressed reluctance to take
on the responsibility of deciding who is and isn't eligible to receive the
subsidy (interview with IISD ofﬁcial).
We also know that it is the poorest who tend to rely on biomass, and
that fuel subsidies alone may not be effective without a targeted cam-
paign that also takes into account the existing Clean Stove Initiative
for improved biomass stoves and other opportunities.
Discussion
This case study offers a comprehensive summary of the existing liter-
ature and public information, supplemented by stakeholder interviews, in
relation to the Indonesia LPG to kerosene conversionprogram from incep-
tion to date (2007–2017). Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that the program was
broadly successful in terms of shifting Indonesian households from kero-
sene to LPG for cooking and expanding the LPGmarket; thiswas primarily
due to the fact that, inmost cases, the shift to LPGwas designed to be less
expensive than not shifting for end-users and kerosene was taken out of
circulation in conversion areas. Taking this and the speed of the conver-
sion into account, the ability to ensure accessibility to the new fuel was
particularly impressive, and was in part due to the national scale of the
conversion, which realized substantial economies of scale in LPGPlease cite this article as: Thoday, K., et al., The Mega Conversion P
recommendations for future clean cooking energy..., Energy Sustain Dev (2infrastructure investments (bulk storage, ﬁlling plants, transportation
and cylinder inventory).
Strong government leadership provided for an effective enabling en-
vironment and regulation of an affordable and accessible fuel supply.
The national oil company, Pertamina was an effective implementer, in
part due to its extensive operational capabilities controlling both kero-
sene and LPG supply systems nationally, while converting existing
agents and retailers from kerosene to LPG meant supply chains did
not have to be established from scratch. In addition, Indonesia, was al-
ready operating under the LPG ‘cylinder recirculation model’ (where
empty cylinders are exchanged for ﬁlled ones), which is considered
the safest and most sustainable LPG market model, as it gives the LPG
company ormarketer ownership and responsibility for its own distribu-
tion network and cylinder brands, discouraging illegal and unsafe prac-
tices such as micro-ﬁlling (WLPGA, 2012).
There was effective co-ordination between Ministries in im-
plementing the program, although Provincial Governments initially
faced challenges issuing retail permits and identifying beneﬁciaries per-
haps indicating a need for greater central co-ordination and oversight of
these functions, to avoid them becoming politicized. More detailed
research into options for vertical integration between central and local
implementation may be of interest going forward, particularly as local
Governments may need to play a greater role in the areas still
undergoing conversion and once the targeted subsidy is introduced in
Indonesia.
Assumptions of cost-effectiveness were backward looking based on
a counter-factual comparison with earlier policy. The legacy of being a
net oil and gas producer has meant that Indonesian Governments
have tended to see oil and gas revenue as Government income, with
subsidies as a component to be managed affordably within this. This
has meant that successive Indonesian Governments have focused sub-
sidy reform on ﬁscal concerns rather than articulated clear social con-
cerns and, consequently, opportunities for greater developmental
impact have been missed (Beaton & Lontoh, 2010). In comparison to
other countries, Indonesia has also invested little in establishing a de-
mographic database or ﬁnancial inclusion policies, making targeted
fuel support to poorer households more challenging. For example, in
2016, only 34% of adult Indonesians were reported as having access to
a ﬁnancial account compared to 63% of the Indian adult population
(FII, 2017). Although in 2005 Indonesia did introduce a Direct Cash As-
sistance program (Banuan Langsung Tunai – BLT) intended to mitigate
the impact of kerosene fuel-price rises on the poor, this relied heavily
on provincial Governments identifying beneﬁciaries and appeared
more suited to emergency relief than a sustainable long-term approach
(Beaton & Lontoh, 2010).rogram from kerosene to LPG in Indonesia: Lessons learned and
018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2018.05.011
10 K. Thoday et al. / Energy for Sustainable Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxxThe narrow objective of the Zero-Kero programmeant that few pro-
gram monitoring indicators were collected and there is very limited
HAP exposure data available in the country as a whole. While health is
stated as a driver for the Clean Stove Initiative launched in 2012 there
is no Government program raising awareness of the health impacts of
burning biomass in inefﬁcient stoves to drive demand for change. Inter-
view ﬁndings suggest a continuing division within the MEMR in terms
of responsibility for different categories of users of domestic fuel and
no involvement of health professionals. It is suggested that publicly
highlighting existing health data that may be attributed to household
air pollution could be a simple way of raising the issue, increasing sup-
port for behaviour change without the need for additional resources.
Conclusions
The Indonesian Zero-Kero program achieved a ﬁve-fold national in-
crease in LPG domestic consumption from 4.7 kg/capita in 2007 to 24.4
kg/capita in 2015. The strong government role and regulatory environ-
ment were essential to creating safe, reliable and nationwide distribu-
tion of the new fuel. Pertamina's position as the nation's sole national
oil company allowed it to direct the conversion of existing fuel distribu-
tors to LPG and undertake infrastructure expansion at a rapid pace. The
free initial LPG start-up package overcame the conversion cost to the
consumer. However, while primary use of ﬁrewood is recorded as hav-
ing halved over the same period, replacing a free fuel with a costed fuel
such as LPG is challenging, particularly in rural areas, and the practice of
fuel-stacking underestimated. LPG subsidies have replaced kerosene
subsidies as a budgetary burden to the Government, which was the
main driver of the conversion program. Plans for limiting subsidies to
those who need them most are being considered but face a new set of
challenges and it will be interesting for Indonesia to both learn from
and compare progress with other countries who are further ahead in
taking such an approach. It is suggested that without greater awareness
raising on the health and social beneﬁts of transitioning to clean fuel,
health impacts will necessarily be harder to achieve.
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